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The Momentum That Never Came:
A Chronology of UN Security Council Reform Debates, 1993-2012
Marina Magalhães Barreto Leite da SILVA?
Abstract
 Using a chronological analysis combined with a support measuring system, this paper demonstrates how 
the so-called points of momentum of the UN Security Council reform process aiming at enlarging the 
Council never really happened. The chronology of facts and the percentages of support for proposals 
reached during the 20 years of offi cial debates (1993-2012) prove that there were no real opportunities for 
reform and, the so-called points of momentum were only impressions. The clear results presented by the 
analysis, this work concluded that the reform never had a real momentum because the low levels of 
support reached on specifi c topics would never make an enlargement possible, given the clear requirement 
for a two-thirds majority in favor of reform among UN membership.
Keywords : Security Council, Reform, Debate, Chronology, Support, Enlargement, Agreement, 
Momentum
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1 – Introduction
 During its 67 years of existence, the Security Council had procedural ups and downs inside the system of 
United Nations (UN). Since the creation of the international organization, the history of the Council has been 
comprised of activities, critics, and attempts to change its composition and methods. The power exercised by 
the Security Council in the UN represents so much of the interests of member states that its functions and 
composition were never laid aside of annual open debates into the General Assembly’s Hall.
 The “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and 
related matters” was established in 1992 as an agenda item and started an offi cial process of debates on the 
reform of the Security Council. These debates were open to all UN members and, as soon as it began, 
established in 1993 an Open-ended Working Group to discuss and find solutions to the crisis of 
representativeness related to the Council. Since then, the debates on these questions were the main stage for 
the presentation of all different opinions and proposals towards the reform by representatives of the UN 
membership.
 Analyzing the reform debates over the last two decades and covering the academic perspectives on how the 
process is being developed, it is easy to question how it was possible for these debates to last for so many 
years. The official opened debates completed 20 years in spite of the points of momentum alleged by 
representatives and researchers. According to the specialists, these points of momentum, were specific 
situations inside the discussions when the reform almost came to a resolution. These apparent agreements 
happened four times: First with the presentation of the Razali’s Plan in 1997; a second time with the 
Millennium Summit in 2000; the third was in 2005 with the report In a larger freedom by Kofi  Annan; and, 
fi nally, when the Intergovernmental Negotiations were implemented in 2009.
 Therefore, how real were these points of momentum for the expansion of seats, when matters of changing the 
Council configuration were never even taken into consideration for voting processes? How close was an 
agreement, if ideas did not receive the necessary support? This paper intends to establish a brief chronological 
analysis of the debates on reforming the UN Security Council, aiming to demonstrate, through a numerical 
system of measuring, how the so-called points of momentum of the reform process never really happened and 
how the multipolarity of UN, as an international organization, is a bad characteristic when it comes to 
benefi ciate the organization per se.
 The analysis in this paper will combine chronological and numerical data to approach the case, in a sum of 
quantitative and qualitative methods; presenting in the two fi rst sections of this paper a background and a 
chronology of facts from the debates on the question of equitable representation inside the Security Council, 
and, the third part, concentrates on the analysis of numerical data generated from the registers of these 
debates.
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2 – Background (1946-1992)
 The creation based on the traumatic experience of the League of Nations granted to the UN Security Council 
an entire existence of contestation, not just about actions towards the maintenance of peace and security, but 
especially about its representative character for the whole membership of the organization. Although the 
practices of the League of Nations had failed to achieve its objectives, the structure of its system was utilized 
as the bottom line to build the UN system and represented a lesson of how founders should deal with this new 
organization aiming its success. The League was the basis of the creation of everything we see currently as 
UN, specially the Security Council. (Hanhimäki, 2008, 17)
 By following the determinations of the UN Charter, which was largely based on the model of the former 
League, the Security Council started to work in January of 1946. The initial composition was of 5 permanent 
members – United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), China, France and Soviet Union (USSR) – and 6 non-
permanent members – elected by the General Assembly for a two-year term and without the possibility of 
immediate reelection after these years.
 Council members established matters of working methods internally, following instructions of Article 30 of 
the fi fth chapter. Questions of seats distribution, format of meetings and elections of presidents, for example, 
were determined inside the Council’s chamber. These methods took the initial distribution of non-permanent 
seats to a frame that became known as the “Gentleman’s Agreement.” “The membership of the Security 
Council in its early years was a refl ection of the principal elements of power in the UN on the one hand and 
the major regional groups of states on the other.” (Bourantonis 2005, 13) According to this informal 
agreement among the 5 permanent members, non-permanent representation inside the Council should be 
regionally divided among Latin America, Middle East, Western and Eastern Europe and the British 
Commonwealth.
 This initial model of distribution just worked perfectly for UN membership during 5 years. Even though, 
during these years some regions were not contemplated at all for participation at the Council. The African and 
the Asian continents, for example, did not receive fostering from the permanent 5 during non-permanent seats’ 
elections and had no opportunities to act prominently inside UN until the ‘60s. As Simon Chesterman 
affirmed, “In addition to the perennial problems of dysfunctional institutions, inadequate resources, and 
ephemeral political will, the [UN] has always faced crises of expectations.”(Chesterman 2006, 59)
 Ten years after the signature of the Charter, the UN membership was expanded from 50 to 76 countries. The 
process of decolonization, after World War II, was responsible for the incredible emergence of new countries 
and actors at the international scene. (Weiss, 2009, 271) By that time, the number of seats at the Council 
already represented only 14% of the membership. Among the 26 new members recognized during this period, 
50% were Asian nations and represented 30% of the entire General Assembly by then. After this great 
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increase in the number of Asian nations, African nations also started to be largely accepted as member states. 
In 5 years – from 1955 until 1960 – 21 African countries became members of UN; at this point the continent 
represented 25% of General Assembly. By 1960, Asia and Africa represented more than 50% of the entire UN 
membership, but yet its representation inside the Security Council was null. In 1963, the UN membership had 
risen to 113 states, yet only 9% of its entire membership were represented inside the Council.
 Therefore, by analyzing a timeline of facts and the initial structure of the organization, it is possible to say 
that UN members were pushed to start, since the inception of the organization for, an active role in 
transforming the representation inside the Security Council. Already in 1955, sixteen Latin American 
countries and Spain presented a fi rst proposal of expansion to the Council’s seats. (UN Yearbook 1956, 147-
149) Nevertheless, only after the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the proposal and 
promulgation of a fi rst actual pattern of seats’ distribution occurred and an only expansion of Council’s seats 
from 11 to 15 – together with an amendment of the Charter – was implemented in 1965. (See document A/
RES/1991(XVIII) A, 1963) The expansion of non-permanent members – from 6 to 10 seats – improved the 
importance of these countries in terms of voting power inside the Council, meaning a real establishment of 
more representation by that time. (Bourantonis, 2005, 28-29)
 However, questions concerning the improvement of representation inside the Council did not leave the main 
stage of considerations as the UN membership did not stop its large scale expansion until the end of the ‘90s. 
Even though the Cold War period represented the achievement of an expansion of seats in the Council, 
answering initial claims of representation, this was the only advance possible inside a paralyzed organization. 
The reform in 1965 raised the representation of the entire UN membership in the Council to almost 13% at 
that time, but by the end of the following twenty fi ve years it would be back to the slight representation of 9%.
 Unlike the stagnation observed during the Cold War period, the ‘90s symbolized a crescent demand of 
actions by the Council. Suddenly, after forty-five years, the Security Council assumed officially its 
responsibility to maintain international peace and security. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the consequent 
end of USSR, the political scene suffered a great change. (Freiesleben, 2008, 2; Smith, 1999, 173) The Soviet 
block was solved, many countries became independent and the UN received a new batch of members. As 
expected, the 159 members of 1990 became 185 by 1994, feeding even more claims of representation inside a 
Council that, by then, started to represent only 8% of the organization as a whole.
 The last decade of the XX century presented a great quantity of turning points to reform discussions on the 
Security Council. This decade represented the fi rst offi cial step towards a desire to demonstrate some kind of 
will to reform the Council. The year of 1979 marked the successful attempt from NAM members to include at 
the General Assembly’s agenda the question of reforming the Security Council (See UN Yearbook 1979, 436), 
but only with the approval of Resolution A/47/RES.62, in 1992, equitable representation inside the Security 
Council became an official topic of the General Assembly’s agenda – the “Question of equitable 
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representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council.” Following the creation of this 
topic and its debates, an Open-ended Working Group on matters of reform was created in 1993, aiming to 
conduct member states to an agreement on how to reform the Council. (See UN Yearbook 1992, 140; UN 
Yearbook 1993, 212)
3 – The debates on a question of equitable representation
 Between the years of 1993 and 1999, meetings on the topic “Question of equitable representation on and 
increase in the membership of the Security Council” were a fertile ground for proposals, opinions and 
decisions on how the process of reform should be conducted. Countries and groups presented its positions on 
a fair method to transform the Council. Every year, in the General Assembly’s hall, all interested members 
stated their points of view, solid principles as well as change of opinion.
 In 1993, the question of equitable representation become item in the agenda of the General Assembly. Italy 
and Turkey, during the debates, proposed establishing a new category of elected seats, with the possibility of 
reelection, following the regional decision on matters of representation. Also, in the beginning of the same 
year, the US and the UK presented offi cial support to the bid of Japan and Germany, while Chile and Egypt 
proposed the creation of regional seats. During the following year, 1994, France also presented support to 
Japan and Germany, and, for the first time, the African group presented its claims for a continent’s fair 
representation inside the Council. the group defended that Africa should receive permanent seats stipulated by 
regional parameters.
 Years later, members saw the celebration of UN’s 50th anniversary, in 1995, as a good opportunity to 
accomplish the reform, which represented some intensive activities on these issues. In February, the NAM 
formed its platform to reform the Security Council. The Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway and Sweden – presented a proposal to create permanent seats for Germany and Japan, and also 3 
more non-permanent seats. Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland and Slovenia 
proposed the creation of 2 permanent seats for the industrialized countries and 2 or 5 more non-permanent 
seats. Turkey proposed the enlargement of the Council with 10 more elected seats; while Mexico presented 
the option to add 5 non-permanent seats and a rotational one for Japan and Germany.
 In 1996, Spain presented a proposal along with the document presented by Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Libya, 
Botswana, Colombia, Mexico, Argentina and Pakistan, with the objective of enlarging the non-permanent 
seats at the Council based of the argument that it would lead to the democratization of the organ.
 In March 1997, after 4 years of deliberations, the President of the General Assembly at the time, Ambassador 
Ismael Razali presented a plan to push the negotiations forward and encourage some member states to assume 
decisive positions on reform matters. According to the schedule organized by the Malaysian ambassador, the 
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so-called “Razali Plan,” initially the General Assembly would vote the expansion of the Security Council in 5 
new permanent members and 4 elected seats; in a second stage, the Assembly would approve another 
resolution specifying the candidates to fi ll the new seats; and, one week later the members would vote the two 
previous resolutions to be added as amendments to the Charter. (See the Report of the Open-Ended Working 
Group, 1997, 5-9)
 The plan from Ambassador Razali raised divergent reactions. While a group of countries – like Brazil, Japan 
and Germany – accepted the proposal as an important factor to construct a perfect momentum for reform, 
other members – like Pakistan, Indonesia, Argentina and Mexico –, representing the position of NAM, 
declared that it was a very authoritarian proposition. Japan and Germany understood the plan as an 
opportunity to fi nally obtain their desired permanent seats and strongly supported Razali’s proposal. Other 
regionally prominent countries as such Brazil and India also viewed the proposition as an opportunity to 
achieve higher positions inside the organization. On the other hand, the majority of NAM members saw this 
model of reform as a quick-fix, that could cause relevant harm to its unity and its consequent power as 
majority.
 In a controversial decade of endless discussions on the reform aspects, Razali Plan ignited the debates. After 
the presentation of this plan and the positioning by NAM, members started to focus their negotiations and 
statements in establishing a ways to approve or destroy Razali’s schedule as soon as possible. The 
presentation of this plan was considered by some delegations as a fi rst great momentum for the Council’s 
reform.
 NAM held two ministerial meetings to discuss Razali’s propositions in 1997 and stated that its 113 members 
would not be in favor of any formula that would increase discrimination between member states and keep the 
Council unable to represent the majority of the UN members. (See the statement by Egypt at the document 
A/52/PV.63, 1997, 4-7) With the discussion polarized by opinions on the plan (Smith, 1999, 187), Italy 
created the group called Coffee Club aiming to join like-minded countries, mostly from NAM, and discuss 
reform possibilities. The Coffee Club assumed the NAM position and started to defend it as a coalition inside 
the reform debates.
 The NAM ministerial meetings occurred in April and September of that year and, while the permanents UK, 
France and US affi rmed their positions of support an expansion limited to a total number of 21 members, the 
Coffee Club presented its fi rst offi cial proposal as a group. The group gathered 32 supporters to ask for the 
establishment of Article number 108 as rule for any decision related to the reform, in 22 October 1997. (See 
document A/52/L.7, 1997) This draft generated an immediate reaction, especially by Japan and Germany, 
pointing the action as a tactic to delay the reform process and destroy the momentum achieved. (Drifte, 2000, 
184-185)
 The polemical draft was discussed for one year and received some adjusts according to what would be more 
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favorable to achieve consensus among members. In 1998, Belgium led a group that also presented a draft 
resolution and, at the same time, accused the Coffee Club initiative as obstructionist. (See the statement by 
Belgium at document A/53/PV.64, 1998, 28-29; See document A/53/L.42, 1998) Attending to negotiations, the 
Coffee Club presented a second draft that lately received around 80 sponsors and expanded signifi cantly its 
base of support. (See documents A/53/L.16 and A/53/L.16.Rev.1, 1998) Therefore, the document presented by 
the Belgium group proved to be irrelevant when the agreement was achieved and the proposal by Coffee Club 
was adopted as the Resolution 53/30 in 23 November 1998. Hopes of a near reform were suppressed with the 
approval of the idea that any kind of reform, possibly adopted in the future, would only be accepted with the 
approval by two-thirds of the entire UN membership. (See document A/53/30, 1998)
 The last decade of the XX century, despite its intense activity and strong positioning, ended as it started, 
extending to the new century the same old discussions and the same old disagreement among members’ 
positions. The year 2000 represented a lot for the UN membership; especially because of the Millennium 
Summit, held in September of that year. With the end of the millennium, the waiting for reform became more 
uncomfortable for the delegations that started a strong exchange of accusations during the opened debates.
 The Millennium Summit was supposed to be a main event of transformation for the UN and represented a 
second hope for a momentum on the reform matters. It called member states to assume a fi rm engagement 
with the organization’s principles and also with the necessity of transform it into a more global arena of 
negotiation. All members realized the favorable moment for a reform and assumed more aggressive positions 
during the debates, especially in discussions related to the Security Council’s reform. Notwithstanding, after 
the beginning of a new debate’s round it became clear that “membership of the UN was still unable to reach 
even a minimum common position.” (Bourantonis, 2005, 86)
 After 11 September 2001 terrorist attack to the World Trade Center, the focus on reforming the Council 
shifted to a stronger approach to working methods. The following years represented a new challenge to the 
Security Council, in terms of action. The so-called “Global War on Terrorism” assumed a central position for 
the membership while the debates on enlargement became secondary topic.
 Nevertheless, a great crisis of legitimacy started inside the United Nations in March 2003, after the 
unapproved invasion of Iraq in March. The US decided to invade the country after presenting accusations that 
Iraq possibly possessed weapons of mass destruction and supposedly gave support to Al-Qaeda in 
Afghanistan back then. The action against the Iraqi government was vetoed by some of the permanent seats, 
such as France, due to lack of evidences in the accusations presented by US representatives. Even with the 
negative answer by the Council, the US army invaded the territory and started a confl ict that lasted for nine 
years. This unfortunate event brought back to the table the extreme necessity of regain legitimacy for the 
Council in the international arena.
 The Secretary General Kofi  Annan presented, then, a proposal of create a High Level Panel on Threats, 
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Challenges and Change as an attempt to motivate members to engage in a real effort to reform the 
organization. After the failure and crisis related to the Iraq War, Annan declared that if the members wanted 
“the Council’s decisions to command great respect, particularly in the developing world, [they would] need to 
address the issue of its composition with greater urgency.” (See the Secretary General statement at A/58/PV.7, 
2003) Thus, the Secretary General assumed a clear position of push member states for results on reform.
 The panel created by Kofi  Annan presented the report A More Secure World: A Shared Responsibility in 
December of 2004 that contained two options of reform models for the Council, in an updated version of 
Razali’s former proposition. The fi rst model (Model A) proposed the enlargement to 24 seats, including 6 new 
permanent and 3 elected members. Model number 2 (Model B) presented the option of create 1 new standard 
elected seats and 8 seats of a new category, renewable every 4 years instead of 2.
 Kofi  Annan presented his report entitled In a larger freedom: towards development, security and human 
rights for all to support the panel’s document in March 2005. As the presentation of the Razali’s Plan in 1997, 
the report and its consequences represented another great hope of momentum for the reform process in 2005. 
(Schrijver, 2007, 134) Members were encouraged by the SG to make a decision quickly on the models 
proposed and reach a consensus by the 2005 World Summit. Thus, the delegations started to present their 
positions in favor or against each of the models placed on the table by the panel and also present their own 
new proposals of reform style, following Annan’s request.
 Three main coalitions assumed an important position inside the discussions of expand the number of seats 
inside the Security Council, answering the Secretary General’s request for more efforts towards the reform: 
The African Union (AU); the Group of Four (G4); and, the Uniting for Consensus (UfC). The G4 was 
presented offi cially as a group during the opened debates on the question of equitable representation of 2004, 
by the Brazilian mission (See document A/59/PV.25, 2004). In February 2005, the UfC document was 
presented by the former Coffee Club’s members, assuming officially the new name and format of the 
coalition. The AU, though, was already an existent regional group since the ‘60s.
 In 6 July 2005, the Group of Four presented its resolution draft for the reform, followed by the African 
Union, in 18 July, and Uniting for Consensus, in 22 July. (See documents A/59/L.64, A/59/L.67 and A/59/
L.68, 2005) Later on that year, in 10 November 2005, the Small Five (S5) also presented its proposal, focused 
on the working methods of the Council.
 The year of 2006 also marked a very important period to the reform discussions with the decision to 
implement intergovernmental negotiations as a new procedure of decision-making on the matters of 
expanding the Council. Thereby, the negotiations were offi cially approved in 15 September 2008 and started 
in February 2009, representing another impression of momentum for the reform by that time.
 After the fi rst round of negotiations, in 2009, the representatives of Italy and Colombia, core members of the 
UfC, presented a new draft resolution, adapting the one distributed in 2005. The new proposal added one of 
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the first ideas of Italy and Turkey inside the reform official debates, back in 1993, calling for the 
establishment of reelections as a possibility for non-permanent members, according to regional choices; as a 
kind of semi-permanent membership.
 The second half of the decade did not represent much of an advance for expansion matters, after the intense 
activity during the fi rst half. With the intergovernmental negotiations, the platform of debate changed but the 
deadlock remained. The first Rome Ministerial Meeting was held in May 2009, organized by the UfC 
members, as an attempt to gather support and consequent results for the reform process. The meeting gathered 
120 states aiming to debate the reform issue and to present the intentions of that group.
 Following this meeting and its developments, a new group was created and presented its own proposal in 6 
September 2011. African, Latin American and Caribbean countries created the so-called L.69 group and its 
proposal was a mixture of G4 and AU objectives. The group, as the other three main ad hoc coalitions 
competing to establish an expansion, did not receive enough support to have its proposal approved by the 
General Assembly.
 The Rome Ministerial Meetings organized by the UfC were kept during the following years, happening in 
February 2012 and March 2013. At the same time, the official debates on the question of equitable 
representation on the Security Council were also maintained. However, the debates on the reform never 
achieved an actual agreement on which model should be adopted to a possible expansion of the Security 
Council, even after so many years of offi cial and unoffi cial efforts.
4 – Measuring support for reform proposals
 Some agreements and disagreements were solidly established among the members during the debates. While 
some general topics received complete support by the entire General Assembly, the more specific ones 
initiated a complex quarrel. All members accepted that the Council should represent the entire membership 
equally, in an effective and transparent way. Especially after the Cold War, a “[m]eaningful reform of the UN 
to respond to this new environment and the challenges it brings requires balancing questions of legitimacy, 
effectiveness, and power.” (Chesterman, 2006, 63) However, even agreeing to create a more equal 
representation in numerical and geographical aspects, the presented models never became common sense.
 Therefore, a system of numerical measuring was used in this paper to establish the analysis of how much 
support each idea and topic over the expansion received during the debates. The system helped in the 
elaboration of a visual map displaying the topics addressed during discussions and showed clearly how 
possible was the real occurrence of a reform during 20 years (1993-2012). The basic material of analysis used 
in this research was the set of statements conceded at the UN General Assembly’s Hall, during the open 
debates on the agenda item “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the 
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Security Council.” During these debates, countries presented, individually or on behalf of regional groups, 
their opinions on the issue of reform the Council.
 It is important to note that the best source of support that should be used in a case related to the UN would 
obviously be voting results and the positions presented by countries during the debates could be different from 
a fi nal vote. However, with exception to the Resolution A/RES/53/30, the reform ideas never received enough 
support to be taken into consideration on a voting process. This, consequently, led researches like this paper, 
to establish only informal levels of support, based on the existing registers. The so-called verbatim records of 
the meetings (PV) are, in this case, the only offi cial sources for a possible measuring of how the expansion 
ideas were addressed by the UN membership.
 Then, this paper considered, during the measuring of these unoffi cial levels, the number of mentions to 
specifi c topics by the member states and established the calculation of averages of these mentions by year. The 
averages of mentions were the base of a comparison with the percentage necessary to an approval in the 
General Assembly – around 66% –; generating speculations on which topic could be approved if submitted to 
a voting process.
 Generally speaking on a possible enlargement of the Council’s membership and on the potential points of 
momentum reached during this process, four main topics must be considered: First, the support to an 
expansion of the existing categories of seats; second, the support to specifi c candidates for new permanent 
seats; third, the question of the veto; and, fi nally, the support received by the 3 main proposals of expansion 
presented by AU, G4 and UfC.
 The issue of expansion of the Security Council, during the debates, assumed a very important position. Most 
of the references to expansion included specifi cations of the missions’ preferences on an enlargement in both 
existent categories – permanent and non-permanent seats – or just in one of them – the non-permanent.
 Thereby, analyzing the numbers collected from the offi cial registers of debates, the restrict support to an 
expansion only in the non-permanent category assumed a very low percentage of positive mentions, while the 
expansion in both categories reached the majority of support during the 20 years of discussions. The absolute 
majority considered in comparison to the level requested in a voting inside the General Assembly (66%) was 
reached only once by the enlargement in permanent and non-permanent seats in 2005, with 72% of positive 
positions by the participants. On the other hand, the open support to an expansion exclusively on elected seats, 
during the debates, had its higher percentage in 2001, when it reached merely 22% of participants’ positive 
positions. (See Chart I)
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 The fi rst expansion of the Council in 1965 happened only in the non-permanent category of seats, but an 
agreement on expanding the Council in both categories was obviously achieved by the delegations from the 
‘90s. Over the years, an expansion similar to the one realized during the ‘60s received the support from only a 
minority of UN member states.
 Nevertheless, the problem of the majority achieved on the matters of expand the existent categories of the 
Council was the lack of specifi city on this decision. Regardless of the high and clear support to an expansion 
in both existent categories, the same cannot be said about the methods to directly specify which countries 
should be understood as capable to assume the responsibilities of permanence.
 Some countries clearly presented the wish to become permanent members inside the Security Council. 
Notwithstanding, even with the direct support received by Japan and Germany from 3 of the 5 permanent 
members – France, the UK and the US –, no country actually received enough support for their bids. 
Mentions to countries were basically reduced to 6 actors: Japan, Germany, Brazil, India, Indonesia and South 
Africa. While the members of G4 – Japan, Brazil, Germany and India – received comparatively more support, 
Indonesia and South Africa received just one mention each, that did not mean any representative result in the 
complete context.
 The apex of specifi c support for the G4 members occurred in 2004 and 2005, with the presentation of the 
draft resolutions for reform. At that moment, the percentages of support reached were 24% for Japan, 19% for 
Germany, 12% for Brazil and 16% for India. However, compared to the percentage of majority considered for 
decisions in the General Assembly, none of the actors that actually received direct mentions from UN 
members reached the necessary level of support for a possible election as new permanent member; not even at 
the moments considered by delegations as points of momentum of the reform process.
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Chart I: Percentage of supportive mentions to an expansion of existent categories (1993-2012)
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 It is also important to consider in this analysis the possible agreement on the question of the veto that 
defi nitively assumed an infl uence on results of the 20 years of debates. Before the beginning of the offi cial 
debates on the reform of the Council, the power to block decisions held by the permanent seats was widely 
criticized by the general UN membership as a privilege that was against the principle of sovereign equality of 
states fi xed at the UN Charter. During the fi rst years of discussions, the veto remained a rejected practice for 
most of the members that demonstrated in diverse ways their positions, calling for a simple constraint of 
power while the absolute abolishment of the veto was not possible. The obvious exception to this rejection 
were the 5 permanent members; US, UK, France, Russia and China.
 The repudiation of veto dominated the debates completely during most of the years, but the positive positions 
on a possible expansion of the power gained strength from 1997. During that year, the African position 
assumed the claim of equality between the possible new permanent seats and the current ones, implementing a 
new variable of complexity to the analysis; at the same time that the African members were against the veto, 
they started to affi rm that an expansion of the power would be reasonable in terms of equality of member 
states. Even though, the talks against the veto dominated the debates and reached a considerable majority in 
2001, with 64%. (See Chart II)
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Chart II: Percentages of mentions for (V) and against (NV) the veto power (1993-2012)
 However, an agreement on reforming or not the veto was never possible due to the affi rmations that no 
reform in that power would be accepted by the current permanents. Any attempt of decisions over the power 
of the permanent members would have been defi nitely blocked by the 5 permanents, independently of how 
agreed it could be among the general membership or how a real momentum could be possibly achieved by the 
discussions.
 Bringing this analysis to an even more specifi c level, it is also possible to observe the levels of support to the 
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main proposals of expansion presented during the 59th session of the General Assembly and its groups. The 
years of 2004 and 2005 represented the mostly active years in terms of membership participation during the 
debates and were also considered a momentum for the reform of the Council.
 As a regional group before the presentation of the draft, the African Union already had a high number of 
mentions during the early years of debates. The so-called African position was presented since the beginning 
of the discussions, in 1993, and received positive feedbacks since that time. When the draft resolution 
presented the ideas of the Ezulwini Consensus in 2005, bringing the entire continent together as a strong 
group to the debate, it only repeated more concretely the claims presented in the reports of the Organization of 
African Unity during the ‘90s. The proposal just brought more offi cial aspects to a position already defended 
strictly since the beginning of the offi cial discussions, but reached a maximum support of only 20.7% in 2011. 
(See Chart III)
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Chart III: Levels of support received by UfC, G4 and AU proposals (2004-2012)
 Differently, even with the previous existence of the Coffee Club, UfC and G4 just started to have positive 
mentions from the presentation of their proposals to the General Assembly. Despite their late arrival to the bid, 
considering the necessary majority of 66% to a possible approval in a voting, the two groups were also not 
able to achieve high percentages, as the maximums reached were: 19% for the UfC, in 2012; and 18.7% for 
the G4, in 2005. (See Chart III) Initially, the G4 received a strong support during the debates, being similar to 
the support received by the AU, but the number fell over the years. On the other hand, the UfC started with 
low positive feedbacks from the delegations and was able to acquire more mentions by 2012.
 The main point that must be highlighted over the support received by the three proposals of enlargement 
presented by UfC, G4 and AU is the fact that their presentations happened in a moment of intense reform 
activities and in years that the UN membership was deeply engaged in pushing forward a transformation of 
the Security Council. Even with this intense round of debates and the presentation of more specifi c ideas on 
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how to reform the Council, a real agreement on the model was never achieved. Thereby, even with the 
impression of a great momentum for the process by that time, this momentum never truly happened.
5 – Conclusion
 It was possible to trace a map of the positioning by missions during the last 20 years of offi cial discussions 
on the reform matters analyzing the speeches and positions on the “Question of equitable representation on 
and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters.” Some conclusions became very 
clear after the combination of the results of a basic numerical system with a chronological organization of 
facts; comparatively measuring the levels of support given by UN members to specifi c topics on the reform of 
the Council.
 In summary, the lack of majority observed in a throughout evaluation of the 20 years of debates on reforming 
the Security Council was very different from the impressions carried by the delegations and point to a very 
signifi cant consideration. The reform of the Security Council probably never had a real momentum, because a 
real agreement among member states was never achieved in a way that could make an enlargement possible.
 Therefore, the majority of 66% requested by the General Assembly for a possible voting approval was never 
reached on specifi c topics of the reform, even considering the events and moments understood as great points 
of momentum for the reform process – the Razali Plan, the Millennium Summit, the years of 2004-2005 and 
the Intergovernmental Negotiations.
 The expectation on the fi rst real proposal of structure for a reform presented by Razali in 1997, for example, 
made the missions understand the step as a great momentum, when it did not occur actually; the numbers 
resulted from mentions inside the debates did not indicate any proximity towards resolutions by that time. 
Another example of a momentum not reached was the presentation of proposals by AU, G4 and UfC to the 
general membership, when an agreement in support one of the draft resolutions was also unable to be 
established; none of the coalitions could reach a level of support higher than 23% and their drafts were not 
even considered for voting attempts.
 The multiplicity of positions, according to some diplomats inside UN, took the organization to the “infi nite 
debate” on establish a more representation inside the Security Council. Multilateralism is one of the strongest 
characteristics of UN. Moreover, as an organization aiming to defend interests that are common between all 
nations in the world, every recognized country has the right to expose its views on international issues. 
However, many important questions regarding the transformation of the Council remain unsolved after twenty 
years of discussions because a common position was never discovered on these matters and the real 
momentum of the Security Council reform never came.
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